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The fear factor is a main thing: 
How radio influences anxiety and political attitudes  
Anouk S. Rigterink1 and Mareike Schomerus2 
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Abstract: 
We investigate how being exposed to media influences levels of anxiety and political 
attitudes in conflict-affected areas. Exploiting exogenous variation in signal strength 
of a radio station in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria State, we compare original 
qualitative and quantitative data from areas with differing radio coverage. Civilians 
living in areas with more exposure to radio are more afraid of attacks by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA). This anxiety means civilians rely more on a civilian 
militia, the arrow boys, and less on the state army. Hence media, through fear, can 
contribute to changing social and political structures. 
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Introduction 
Can the power of media be harnessed to positive effect to improve situations of violent 
conflict? In conflict situations, media has been considered both as contributing to 
hatred, most prominently during the Rwandan genocide (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012), as 
well as a force for peacebuilding (Paluck and Green, 2009a; Paluck and Green, 2009b; 
Orme, 2010; BBC Media Action, 2012). Setting up a radio station has become standard 
UN practice in post-conflict situations (Orme, 2010). However, the role of media in 
situations of violent conflict or developing countries, be it a positive or a negative one, is 
under-theorised and empirical evidence is scarce (Paluck and Green, 2009b; Schoemaker 
and Stremlau, 2014).  
The same cannot be said of theories and empirical studies on the role of media in 
developed countries without violent conflict. In these contexts, media is sometimes 
thought to cultivate fear (Furedi, 1997; Furedi, 2005). Numerous theories describe how 
media might influence risk estimation, ranging from rational choice models (Fielding and 
Shortland, 2009) to theories emphasizing ‘automatic’ and subconscious modes of 
thinking (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan and Signorielli, 1980). 
Research on the fear-inducing effect of media goes back more than thirty years (Gerbner 
et al., 1980) but whether and through what mechanism media contributes to anxiety 
remains subject of debate and evidence is heavily dominated by studies in developed 
countries. The potential fear-inducing effect of media is of interest especially in light of a 
growing literature on the role of emotions in the formation of political attitudes, in 
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which anxiety plays a particularly prominent role  (for an overview see Neuman, Marcus, 
Crigler and Mackuen, 2007). This suggests that the impact of emotions and anxiety in 
particular might not be limited to the personal domain. Feeling anxiety might possibly 
have wider social and political consequences.  
We situate our interdisciplinary examination of the impact of exposure to media at the 
intersection of these three literatures. We examine whether intensity of exposure to 
media is related to increased anxiety and whether increased anxiety has an impact on 
political attitudes in a post-conflict situation. We find evidence for both relationships 
and investigate the mechanism through which they operate. 
To do so, we exploit exogenous variation in the signal strength of a specific radio 
station, Yambio FM, in what was at the time of research South Sudan’s Western 
Equatoria State (WES). Controlling for distance to the points of transmission, residual 
variation in signal strength of Yambio FM is likely due to geographical factors such as 
minor differences in elevation blocking the line of sight between transmitter and 
receiver. We use this residual variation in signal strength to study how the quality of 
radio reception influences fear of being a victim of violence by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA), the consequences of such fear for political attitudes, and the implications 
of our findings for media as a peacebuilding tool. We show that residual variation in 
signal strength is unrelated to actual LRA activity. It is also unrelated to various 
demographic characteristics of individuals, which mitigates concerns that signal strength 
or geographic factors impacting signal strength are related to our outcomes of interest—
fear and political attitudes—through some intervening factor. The main alternative radio 
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station, UN-run Radio Miraya, uses a different type of transmitter and reception of this 
station does not correlate to reception of Yambio FM. Thus, the pattern of variation 
observed is unique to Yambio FM. Yambio FM broadcasts ‘come home’ messages, 
which aim to encourage LRA fighters to defect, in addition to broadcasting general 
information about the security situation—during which the LRA is regularly mentioned 
(Lancaster and Cakaj, 2013). We draw on original qualitative (a textual analysis of 70 
open-ended interviews or group meetings) and quantitative (a survey of 433 individuals 
in ten villages) data from areas with different degrees of reception of Yambio FM.  
We first show that people living in a village with better reception of Yambio FM report 
significantly higher levels of fear of an LRA attack. The degree of exposure to media 
appears to contribute to a general sense of anxiety. This result is robust to controlling for 
a number of factors that might influence levels of anxiety, such as actual LRA activity, 
presence of other armed forces, distance to the two nearby international borders with 
the Central African Republic (CAR) or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
mobile phone network coverage, personal experience of displacement and date of 
enumeration.  
We then explore two theoretical mechanisms that connect exposure to media to 
anxiety: the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and a rational choice 
model emphasizing the cost of obtaining information (Fielding and Shortland, 2009). 
Interview data provides suggestive evidence in favour of the availability heuristic over 
the rational choice model. Our subsequent investigation of the effect of anxiety on 
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political attitudes shows that fear has an impact beyond the personal domain. 
Interviewees described a disconnect between what they heard in the media—where it 
was suggested that a threat exists, thus causing anxiety—and the action taken by so-
called official actors. Crucially the South Sudanese army (Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army, SPLA) is not seen to be acting upon this threat and seemingly disregard it. The 
experience of such disconnect contributes to legitimizing a new authority structure: a 
local civilian protection militia called the ‘arrow boys.’ Crucially, the legitimacy of the 
arrow boys in these areas goes beyond matters of security, altering social and political 
structures in the affected areas. We find evidence that higher levels of fear, as predicted 
by radio reception, are related to increased reliance on the arrow boys and decreased 
reliance on the SPLA, although we do not obtain strong results across all quantitative 
indicators of political attitudes.  
Two competing theories provide an explanation for the relationship between 
anxiety and political attitudes. Interview data is most consistent with ‘Affective 
Intelligence’ (Marcus, Neuman and Mackuen, 2000).  
We thus conclude that in this case, exposure to media does contribute to a climate of 
fear. The mismatch of such anxiety with the action taken by official actors has an impact 
on political attitudes, enforcing the position of the arrow boys as a social and political 
authority. Thus, this paper provides evidence that in the context of violent conflict in a 
developing country, media creates fear and that this fear influences political attitudes that 
in turn can contribute to changing social structures. The findings suggest caution when 
implementing media-based interventions in such situations. 
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two summarises the 
literature on media and anxiety, anxiety and political attitudes and media in violent 
conflict. Section three provides background on the case study. Section four describes 
data, methods and research design. Section five presents the results on media and 
anxiety, and section six the results on anxiety and political attitudes. Section seven 
concludes.  
Theory and literature 
This study contributes to three strands of literature, the literature on media and anxiety, 
literature on anxiety and political attitudes, and literature on media in conflict contexts. 
The first two strands of literature share an interest in the role of behavioural processes, 
such as automatic (World Bank, 2015) or heuristic (Neuman et al., 2007) decision 
making. Empirically, these literatures are heavily dominated by studies of developed 
countries, most notably the US. This study contributes to these literatures by providing 
empirical evidence for the relationship between media and anxiety, as well as anxiety and 
political attitudes, in a developing country context. Furthermore, investigating the 
processes underlying these relationships, the study provides evidence for the relevance 
of two specific automatic or heuristic processes in these contexts. Few studies in the 
literature and media and conflict have so far investigated importance of behavioural 
processes, problematizing a direct link between information, attitudes and behaviour 
(with the exception of Paluck and Green, 2009b). 
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Media and anxiety  
The idea that media reporting on particular risks leads to fear has a long intellectual 
tradition: the Cultural Indicators research project started research on this topic in the 
1960s (Gerbner et al., 1980). A number of theoretical models, based on different 
theoretical premises, explain how exposure to media could increase perceived risk, 
specifically the risk of becoming a victim of violence. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
formulated the concept of 'availability' which may explain the link between media and 
risk estimation (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973). These authors argued that individuals 
often use automatic processes to estimate risks, rather than effortful deliberation. The 
effect of automatic or heuristic—rather than strictly rational—decision-making has 
gained prominence in international development thinking with the publication of the 
2015 World Development Report (World Bank, 2015). Availability is such an automatic 
processes. It poses that individuals judge the probability of an event by the ease with 
which an example of such an event comes to mind. If media reporting makes examples 
of adverse events more available, exposure to media may lead individuals to think that 
adverse events occur more frequently than they really do. 
More recently, Fielding and Shortland (2009) propose that a link between exposure to 
media and risk perception is consistent with a (bounded) rational choice model they term 
'costly information'. In situations when obtaining further information on adverse events 
is difficult, it may be rational for individuals to take the frequency of media reporting as 
an indicator of the probability of these events (Fielding and Shortland, 2009).  
 Page 8 of 57 
Despite the strong theoretical basis, empirical evidence on the link between media and 
fear is mixed (for three overviews see Heath and Gilbert, 1996; Eschholz, 1997; 
Wahlberg and Sjoberg, 2000). This study provides empirical evidence that a link between 
media and fear also exists in the context of a developing country. This is especially 
relevant since empirical literature is heavily dominated by US-based studies. 
Furthermore, we contribute to the debate on whether this relationship is best explained 
by a (bounded) rational choice or a heuristic model, providing suggestive empirical 
evidence in favour of the latter. 
Anxiety and political attitudes 
A recent upsurge in research on the role of emotions in political thinking suggests that 
the impact of anxiety may extend beyond the personal sphere (Neuman et al., 2007). An 
influential theory is Marcus et al.’s ‘Affective Intelligence’ (Marcus et al., 2000), which 
posits that when faced with a familiar situation requiring a political opinion, cognitive 
decision making—that is weighing of all options—is too costly. This means that 
individuals rely on heuristic processes, including habit or partisan attitudes, to shape 
their political attitude (Marcus et al., 2000). In unexpected and uncertain situations, 
however, cognitive decision making does pay off. A feeling of anxiety signals to 
individuals whether they are in a familiar or unexpected situation. When anxious, 
individuals actively seek out additional information (for example about the plans and 
behaviour of political figures) and engage in high-involvement cognitive decision 
making. The authors stress that emotions such as anxiety thus can have an impact that is 
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‘largely functional and rational’ (Mackuen et al., 2007, p.126). Anxiety thus helps 
individuals in forming a political opinion closer to their true preference while avoiding 
the unnecessary costs of seeking and processing information. 
Other theories propose a more direct role for emotion, and a more decided departure 
from rationality. An individual’s emotion when confronted with a political actor may 
directly translate into a political attitude, so-called 'Affect Transfer' (Ladd and Lenz, 
2008; Ladd and Lenz, 2011). Relatedly, individuals may use information to build up a 
positive or negative affective tag attached to a political actor and then forget the initial 
information relatively quickly. Once a tag is created, individuals find it easier to process 
information that is consistent with this tag. Hence, new information contradicting the 
existing tag is not given adequate weight, and an individual’s political attitude may only 
very slowly, if at all, be updated to a point close to their true preference (Cassino and 
Lodge, 2007).  
Limited empirical evidence exists for the link between anxiety and political attitudes 
(Neuman et al., 2007). Our study provides such evidence in the context of a developing 
country, again distinguishing between the two processes through which emotions may 
influence political attitudes. We are finding evidence in favour of Affective Intelligence. 
Media and violent conflict 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on the role of media in peacebuilding or 
statebuilding especially in situations affected by violent conflict. The power of media, 
particularly of radio, in these contexts has been greatly emphasised in policy literature 
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(BBC Media Action, 2012). Orme for example, states that ‘[UN radio stations] have 
helped end violent conflict and make political transition possible’ (Orme, 2010, p.8). In 
post-genocide Rwanda, radio is indeed found to have contributed to changes in 
individual behaviour, if not attitudes (Paluck and Green, 2009b). Other studies 
investigating whether broadcasting hate speech over the radio can incite violence and 
deepen divides in societies, again most prominently in Rwanda, had mixed results 
(Straus, 2007; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012).  
Evidence that media adequately performs a prominent role in either peacebuilding or 
statebuilding is, however, weak (Schoemaker and Stremlau, 2014). Little empirical work 
has been done on the effects of media in conflict situations (Paluck and Green, 2009b); 
research into the statebuilding impact of radio is scarce. The present study provides 
implications for the statebuilding impact of radio, and is a case in point for the relevance 
of examining behavioural processes connected to media and conflict. 
Background 
Ezo and Tambura 
This study is based on data gathered in two counties of what was at the time (2013) the 
South Sudanese state of Western Equatoria. The two counties, Ezo and Tambura, 
border the DRC and CAR respectively and lie up to a day’s travel by car, or between 60 
and 160 kilometres as the crow flies, away from the state capital Yambio. Both Ezo and 
Tambura are densely forested. Small-scale agriculture is the dominant livelihood. The 
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population of Ezo and Tambura is linguistically and ethnically remarkably homogenous: 
92.5 per cent of respondents are likely Azande, as they speak Pazande as their first 
language. Few respondents appear to be Pazande-speaking refugees from CAR or DRC: 
96.3 per cent of respondents say their nationality is South Sudanese. 
LRA in Western Equatoria 
The LRA’s beginnings lie in 1986 events in Uganda, the year President Yoweri Museveni 
took power.3 Northern Uganda’s rebellion against the new president proved the most 
successful, emerging later as the LRA under the leadership of Joseph Kony. Having had 
bases in Eastern Equatoria State since the early 1990s (Prunier, 2004), the LRA moved 
into what was then Sudan’s WES in 2005 (Schomerus, 2007). LRA activity subsided 
during the Juba Peace Talks between the LRA, and the Government of Uganda held 
from 2006−2008 (Schomerus, 2008; Atkinson, 2010; Schomerus, 2012). Residents of 
WES remained suspicious of the rebel presence and of the government’s willingness to 
protect (Gordon, Vandewint and Lehmeier, 2007; Schomerus and Tumutegyereize, 
2009). In December 2008, the talks ended with a military offensive on the LRA camp in 
the DRC, executed by the Ugandan army with US support (Atkinson, 2009). Ugandan 
forces have been present in Ezo County and just across the border in the CAR since that 
time, more recently as part of an African Union military response that also includes 
soldiers from the SPLA and CAR. US military advisors have been supporting the 
Ugandan forces in this operation since 2011 as part of US legislation against the LRA 
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(11th Congress of the United States of America, 2010; Schomerus, Allen and 
Vlassenroot, 2011). UN peacekeepers are also based in the area. 
Since the poorly planned military offensive (Atkinson, Lancaster, Cakaj and Lacaille, 
2012) the LRA has been present in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan; however 
attacks and movement have decreased considerably since 2009, especially in South 
Sudan. The LRA Crisis Tracker, a database compiling reports of LRA-related incidents, 
including sightings, abductions and instances of violence, reports significant drops in the 
number of events in 2009 and 2010 (LRA Crisis Tracker, 2015). Only two events were 
reported in 2012 and none in the 12 months preceding the 2013 survey. Interviews 
suggest a similar pattern. There was, explained an international aid worker, only one 
‘genuine LRA attack in Ezo’, which happened in 2009.4 Even once heavily affected areas 
appear free of LRA attacks in later years. In one boma—South Sudan’s smallest 
administrative unit, essentially a village—where ten people were reported killed by LRA 
since 2008, the last reported LRA attack had been in March 2011. In late 2013, after our 
period of research, there was a brief moment of activity and sightings, although the exact 
nature of the perpetrators was unclear. Even at the height of LRA activity in South 
Sudan, levels of reported LRA-related violence were significantly lower than in DRC and 
CAR (Human Rights Watch, 2009). While each single violent incident is a tragedy, it is 
fair to say that there were few LRA attacks in WES.  
 Page 13 of 57 
Yambio FM 
An affiliate of the government radio network, Yambio FM has been this area’s main 
broadcaster since 2009, suffering sporadic interruptions between February and July 2013 
due to equipment failure (Nashion, 2013b; Nashion, 2013a). Broadcasting from Yambio 
town, Yambio FM transmits general security information, which can also include reports 
on LRA attacks in the neighbouring countries. In addition, Yambio FM’s broadcasts 
include ‘come home’ messages, which are targeted radio announcements to LRA fighters 
with messages that encourage them to defect. These ‘come home’ messages—sometimes 
recorded by people the fighters know personally—have been used extensively in 
northern Uganda (Ginifer, 2006; Brisset-Foucault, 2011). Reach has been increased to 
cover areas of LRA operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the Central 
African Republic (CAR), and South Sudan (Invisible Children, 2013; Lancaster and 
Cakaj, 2013). It is important to note that these messages are broadcast in South Sudan 
even at a time when they are unlikely to reach any LRA fighters.  
Data, Methods and Research Design 
This paper combines qualitative and quantitative methods, and data gathered through 
interviews and as well as a survey of individuals. An initial analysis of qualitative work—
mainly interviews, publications and official records—informed the formulation of our 
research question and survey design. Both methods were used to investigate the impact 
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of radio on anxiety, and the impact of anxiety on fear. Interview data furthermore sheds 
some light on the mechanisms through which these variables are connected. 
This interdisciplinary approach has strengths and weaknesses. Working across methods 
and disciplines enabled us to develop a complex research question that would not 
naturally emerge in a quantitative approach. Using data from two methods seems to 
allow for an accurate representation of the effects under investigation. Being able to 
corroborate qualitative findings on how people perceive their security situation with 
quantitative data makes our findings more convincing and we could develop a 
perspective on both individual experiences as well as broadly measurable phenomena.  
Data 
The qualitative data is primarily drawn from interviews with some interviews that 
informed the research question dating back to 2006. The most relevant interviews—
about 70 open-ended interviews or group meetings—were conducted between 
December 2012 and May 2013 in Ezo and Tambura Counties, largely in bomas randomly 
selected for the quantitative survey. We quote 25 interviewees directly with a brief 
description of the respondent and location of the interview. Other responses have 
informed our findings. We selected respondents for the interviews in various ways: 
because they hold a position of authority in the community, represent a particular 
community, or because we encountered them in a snowballing fashion. We assured 
respondents anonymity. 
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Quantitative data was gathered through a survey of individuals in Ezo County and 
adjacent areas of Tambura County in May 2013. In total, we surveyed 433 individuals in 
ten bomas. We randomly selected seven (out of 26) bomas in Ezo and three (out of nine) 
bomas in the two southern-most payams (the next level administrative unit) of Tambura 
County.  
Within these bomas, we randomly selected households from lists that the headmen (local 
administrators who work with the chiefs) either kept or drew up on the spot. We 
selected a maximum of 44 households in each boma, which in two cases meant all 
households in the boma. Within the households, the individual respondent was again 
selected at random from a list of individuals over 18 years within the household. A 
numbered list of household members was drawn up with the household head or another 
readily available member of the household, and a random person selected by physically 
drawing a number using numbered bottle caps. Enumerators resident in the two 
counties administered all questionnaires in the local language Pazande. The survey report 
gives more detailed information (Rigterink, Kenyi and Schomerus, 2014). We also 
obtained the GPS coordinates of a central point in each boma using a satellite phone.  
From the survey data, we derived indicators for the quality of reception of Yambio FM 
in the boma, for individual level of fear of the LRA and for individual attitudes towards a 
civilian protection militia (the arrow boys) and the government army (the SPLA). An 
overview of relevant survey questions and the indicators derived from these is given in 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Relevant questions from survey in Ezo and Tambura counties, WES 
________________________ 
Figure 1 here 
_______________________ 
In addition to original data, we use data from the LRA Crisis Tracker: the date and 
geographical location of events classified as abductions, violence, looting, sightings, 
clashes and displacement related to the LRA. Using this data and the geographical 
location of the villages surveyed, we calculated the straight line distance between the 
village and the single closest LRA event and the average distance to the ten closest LRA 
events in the last one, two and five years respectively. We also calculated the distance 
between the village and the towns of Yambio (the location of the transmitter of Yambio 
FM), Ezo and Tambura. The latter two are the potential locations of two relay stations 
of Yambio FM. Lastly, during the second survey round in January and February 2015, 
we also asked respondents whether they could receive one of the few alternative radio 
stations that can be received in the region, Radio Miraya FM.  
Research design 
To investigate the impact of media on individual perceptions of security and political 
attitudes, we exploit plausibly exogenous variation in the quality of reception of Yambio 
FM. Our preferred specification uses variation in radio reception at the boma, rather than 
the individual level. In the latter case, estimates of the effect of having a radio capable of 
receiving Yambio FM on fear of the LRA might be biased upward if individuals who 
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already have great fear of the LRA put more effort into seeking out information about 
them. Nevertheless, in the online appendix, we also present a model at the individual 
level, including boma fixed effects. 
Figure 2 illustrates variation in quality of reception of Yambio FM at the boma level. We 
exploit the fact that although Yambio FM’s signal becomes weaker with the distance to 
Yambio, this decrease is not uniform. For example, bomas nine and ten are within 
walking distance of each other, but reception of Yambio FM differs substantially 
between them. Residual variation in the quality of reception of Yambio FM, controlling 
for straight line distance Yambio (the location of the transmitter) and Ezo and Tambura 
(the possible locations of two relay stations) is likely due to geographic factors blocking 
the line of sight to the transmitter, such as minor differences in elevation or overgrowth. 
These geographic factors are plausibly unrelated to other factors creating fear of the 
LRA for a number of reasons. First, these factors are not necessarily close to the boma in 
question, they merely have to be in the line of sight between boma and transmitter. 
Second, variation in geographic factors is minor: the difference between the lowest and 
highest point in our research area for example is less than 350 meters. Third, even if 
minor geographic differences impeding radio reception are related to LRA activity, 
mountainous and forested areas are usually associated with more, not less activity by 
violent groups (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom, 2004; Buhaug and Rød, 2006). So to the 
extent that geography and LRA activity are related, this would bias our estimates of the 
effect of radio on fear downward, not upward. Other authors use similar strategies when 
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investigating the impact of radio (Olken, 2009; Della, Vigna, Enikolopov, Mironova, 
Petrova and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2012). 
Figure 2: Ability to receive Yambio FM 
________________________ 
Figure 2 here 
_______________________ 
Nevertheless, we explore the correlation between LRA activity and residual radio 
reception in Table 1. It displays the (bivariate) correlation between a number of 
indicators for LRA activity and residual variation in boma radio reception after 
controlling for straight line distance to Yambio, Ezo and Tambura. Residual radio 
reception is not significantly related to measures of LRA activity derived from the LRA 
Crisis Tracker (Panel A and B). The same holds true for other potential indicators of 
LRA activity in panel C: Victimization according to our survey and distance to the 
border with CAR and DRC respectively, the two countries where the LRA is suspected 
to be. Hence, we find no evidence that the LRA is more active in areas with better 
residual radio reception. However, the analysis that follows will also explicitly control for 
LRA activity. 
Table 1: Correlation between residual radio reception and LRA activity 
________________________ 
Table 1 here 
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_______________________ 
 
Table 2 further explores the exogeneity of reception of Yambio FM (controlling for 
distance to Yambio, Ezo and Tambura) by investigating whether it is correlated to 
observed individual characteristics and household asset ownership as an indicator of 
wealth. In the latter case, we also control for number of children and adults in the 
household, as larger households likely own more assets out of necessity rather than 
wealth. As is evident from Table 2, the quality of reception of Yambio FM is not 
significantly related to any of the assets considered, including radio ownership. 
Furthermore, it is unrelated to age and educational status. Boma radio reception is 
significantly related to gender, although this coefficient is only significant at the ten per 
cent level. Hence, Table 1 provides no strong evidence that the quality of reception of 
Yambio FM is related to some potentially confounding observable individual 
characteristics. In the subsequent analysis, all these characteristics will be controlled for.  
Table 2: Correlation between boma radio reception and observable individual and 
household characteristics  
 
________________________ 
Table 2 here 
_______________________ 
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Any effect on fear or political attitudes observed may be due to any information 
broadcast by Yambio FM. However, we have reason to believe that people in WES are 
especially sensitive to information about the LRA. During qualitative interviews, the 
LRA appeared at the forefront of people’s minds, as general questions such as ‘what is 
life like here’ elicited responses about the LRA. From the survey data, the existence of 
‘come home’ messages is better known among respondents than the existence of 
Yambio FM itself. That said, we cannot distinguish between the impact of exposure to 
Yambio FM and exposure to LRA-specific information.  
Variation in the quality of reception of Yambio FM is distinct from the quality of 
reception of the main alternative radio station, UN-run Radio Miraya FM. This station 
uses a transmitter with a wider range, broadcasting from Juba. From data collected in 
2015, reception of Miraya FM is not correlated to reception of Yambio FM: the 
correlation coefficient between the two is -0.09. The relevance of Miraya FM is limited in 
WES because it broadcasts in English and Arabic: the survey indicates that more than 
half of the respondents do not speak either of these languages as their first or second 
language. As Miraya FM does not broadcast ‘come home’ messages, we investigate 
whether reception of Miraya FM is related to fear of the LRA by way of a placebo test. 
Analysis 
Analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data is based on a comparison of responses 
of individuals living in villages with differing levels of radio reception. The analysis starts 
from the qualitative data. We examine themes emerging from qualitative interviews using 
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textual analysis, by considering villages with different degrees of access to Yambio FM. 
Doing this, we generate hypotheses on how radio affects civilian’s perceptions of 
security and their political attitudes. All interviews were transcribed and coded using 
MaxQDA. The inductive coding process focussed on the developing themes under 
investigation, such as access to and trust in information, description of the perceived 
security situation, lifestyle choices (for example where to live and what crops to grow), 
expectations of political actors regarding the security situation and in general. Reponses 
thus coded were then divided into two groups: responses from individuals living in 
bomas with above median radio reception according to the survey, and responses of 
individuals living in bomas with below median radio reception. We then compared the 
nature of responses in these two groups to develop analytical categories and to generate 
the hypothesis of a possible link between radio exposure, fear, and political attitudes. 
These were then tested against the quantitative data.  
We analyse quantitative data using the following model:  
𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑏𝑖  =  ß0  +  ß1𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑏  + ß𝟐𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑪𝑬𝒃  +  ß𝟑𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖           (1) 
where 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑏𝑖 is the individual-specific level of fear of the LRA, measured as 
detailed in Figure 1, 𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑏 is boma radio reception, 𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑪𝑬𝒃 is a vector including 
the straight line distance from the boma to Yambio, Ezo and Tambura respectively and 
𝑿𝒊 is a vector of individual-specific control variables including all observable 
characteristics in Table 2. As 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑏𝑖 is measured on a four-point scale, we use an 
ordered probit model to estimate (1), although similar results are obtained using an 
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ordered logit model. The literature on media and anxiety implies ß1 > 0. Standard errors 
in all models are clustered at the boma level. 
To investigate the relationship between anxiety and political attitudes, we estimate this 
set of models: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐵𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑏𝑖 = ß0 + ß1𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑖̂ + ß𝟐𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑪𝑬𝒃 + ß𝟑𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖  (2) 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑖 = ß0 + ß1𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑖̂ + ß𝟐𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑪𝑬𝒃 + ß𝟑𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖    (3) 
𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊 𝐵𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑏𝑖  and 𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑖 are individual-specific indicators for the 
respondent’s attitude towards Arrow Boys and the SPLA respectively. We experiment 
with various indicators of this. 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑖 in both models is considered endogenous 
and is instrumented for using boma radio reception (𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑏). All models are estimated by 
IVprobit. 
One concern with the IV strategy is that reception of Yambio FM may influence 
political attitudes directly, by broadcasting information about the arrow boys or the 
SPLA. This would violate the exclusion restriction. We judge this unlikely in the case of 
the arrow boys. The arrow boys are organised at the community level and the way they 
have engaged with communities is much more directly than through radio. In interviews, 
respondents did not mention getting information about the arrow boys over the radio. 
When talking about their attitudes towards the SPLA, respondents to the interviews did 
not mention receiving information about this actor over the radio either, and instead 
referred to their personal observations. Nevertheless, to the extent that respondents 
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receive information about the arrow boys or SPLA by way of Yambio FM, our IV 
strategy conflates the impact of fear of the LRA and the impact of having access to this 
information.  
 
Media and anxiety: Fear as an effect of quality of reception of Yambio 
FM  
Main results 
In qualitative interviews, respondents acknowledged the absence of LRA activity close to 
them but expressed fear that the LRA would return and a deep sense of insecurity 
overall. Despite describing their fear of the LRA, respondents also noted that the LRA 
had not appeared in a long time, often acknowledging without being prompted that the 
LRA was, in fact, far away. This suggests that ‘objective’ information on risk—in this 
case the lived experience that the LRA had not been in the area for a long time—does 
not match people’s perceptions of being at high risk of an LRA attack. Not having 
experienced an LRA attack for a long time does not lessen the constant fear that has 
become a feature of everyday lives. Although the LRA has barely been present in South 
Sudan, people living in Tambura and Ezo Counties experience their situation as being 
acutely risky at all times. In a community meeting in one affected boma, respondents 
summed up why the impression that the LRA is near matters. Although the last LRA 
attack happened years ago ‘until now when people are in the bush [to tend to their 
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fields], they fear that LRA is coming. It brings trouble to their minds.’5 ‘The fear factor is 
a main thing,’ was how one international respondent summed up the damaging effect of 
permanently hearing about the LRA.6  
This high level of fear is also reflected in survey responses: 75 per cent of the 
respondents report having feared an LRA attack ‘often' in the past year. This 
corresponds strongly with the picture that emerged from qualitative research: Fear is 
high, regardless of what the actual security situation has been.  
A comparison of the responses from areas with different levels of radio reception 
suggests that individuals in areas with above median radio reception are more likely to 
express anxiety about the LRA. In areas with above median radio reception, people 
described their fear of the LRA and the long-term effects of LRA presence in practical 
terms, recounting concretely how fear influenced their day-to-day lives. Members of a 
women’s group described how women from both sides of the border with the DRC 
were no longer moving across and that free movement was now a prerogative of armed 
men: ‘Before LRA we used to go and buy rice and palm oil from there, sometimes nuts.’7 
A middle-aged man described how ‘life before LRA was not bad, but with some 
problem, but people used to go without fear. Since LRA, people cannot even go 200 
meters to cultivate. And we are still scared of the people they killed. So life before was 
good because there was no fear. Now there is still fear in our heart.’8 In a third boma, an 
executive chief explained how convincing people to return to their villages had taken 
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two years since the last reported LRA attack: ‘Some are still reluctant because they fear 
LRA can come back.’9 
In areas with below median radio reception, while the LRA more generally often came 
up, fear was specifically mentioned only once. In this case, fear of the LRA was used as 
an example in a different context—as a reason to support a government headed by a to-
be-crowned Zande King—and clearly placed in the past: ‘The king will alert [the people] 
what is coming. Because in the past [the people] received [security] information late. Like 
the insecurity of the LRA, they did not know [the LRA] were coming, but the king 
would have alerted [the people].’10 
Quantitative data confirms the finding that people who live in areas with better 
reception of Yambio FM fear the LRA more, are substantially more scared in their 
everyday lives, and live their lives accordingly. Table 3 shows the results of estimating 
model (1). It shows a consistent, positive and statistically significant relationship between 
radio reception and fear of the LRA. Our baseline results in column (1) indicate that 
boma level reception of Yambio FM is positively related to fear of the LRA. This effect is 
substantial in size: the model suggests that moving from the lowest to highest level of 
radio coverage observed in our sample is associated with an increase in probability that a 
respondent reports to fear the LRA ‘often’ from 61.4 per cent to 92.4 per cent, holding 
all control variables at their mean level.  
Table 3: Reception of Yambio FM and fear 
_________________ 
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Table 3 here 
________________ 
Colum (2) of Table 3 shows that similar results are obtained when using an ordered logit 
instead of an order probit model. Column (4) shows the result of a placebo test. One 
may be concerned that the observed effect of radio reception on fear is due to the 
reception of other radio stations, or that radio reception in general is related to some 
confounding factor influencing fear, such as remoteness. If either explanation holds, one 
would expect boma level reception of Miraya FM to also have a significant and positive 
effect on fear of the LRA. However, column (4) shows that this is not the case. In fact, 
reception of Miraya FM is negatively related to fear of the LRA. Columns (5) and (6) 
give an indication of the effect of quality of reception of Yambio FM on people’s daily 
activities. We focus on activities taking place when it is dark, as respondents most often 
perceive these activities as unsafe. Inhabitants of areas with better radio coverage were 
significantly more likely to say they feared going to their fields at night (column 5) and 
travelling to another village by night (column 6). Overall we find that being able to 
receive Yambio FM is associated with increased fear.  
Although we have shown earlier that boma radio reception is uncorrelated to LRA 
activity, one may be concerned that these results are driven by actual LRA activity. 
Table  explicitly controls for the measures of LRA activity presented in Error! 
Reference source not found.. In the interest of brevity, we omit the coefficients on all 
other control variables.  
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Table  shows that indicators for LRA activity are generally not significantly related to 
fear of the LRA. Columns (1) and (2) show that controlling for years since the last victim 
of LRA violence in the boma does not affect the results; the size of the coefficient on 
boma radio reception increases compared to the baseline estimates when including these 
two variables. Columns (3)-(6) use LRA Crisis Tracker data on LRA activity. Our results 
are qualitatively unaffected in column (4) and (5), but the coefficient on boma radio 
reception loses statistical significance in the models presented in columns (3) and (6). 
Although this could imply that earlier results are spurious, it is also possible that adding 
three more boma level variables for distance creates multicolinearity, inflating the 
standard errors and causing the coefficient of interest to lose significance. In this 
context, it is important to note that in both columns, the coefficients of interest lose 
statistical significance due to an increase in the size of the standard error, not due to a 
decrease in the size of the coefficients. Calculating the correlations between the six 
measures of LRA activity from column (3) and column (6) and the three variables in the 
𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑪𝑬𝒃 vector, reveals that the two sets of variables are indeed strongly 
correlated. Out of the 18 correlation coefficients, 12 exceed 0.4 and three exceed 0.75. 
Entering the six indicators for LRA activity in the baseline specification separately results 
in the coefficient on boma radio reception to be statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level in all cases.  
Table 4: Controlling for LRA activity 
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__________________ 
Table 4 here 
__________________ 
These arguments, combined with the unchanged results in the other models presented in 
Table  and the lack of statistical significance of most of the indicators for LRA activity 
leads us to conclude that our baseline results are at least reasonably robust to controlling 
for actual LRA activity. Results in the online appendix to this articles furthermore show 
that the relationship between boma radio reception and fear of the LRA is unaffected by 
controlling for the presence of other armed forces, distance to the CAR or DRC border, 
phone coverage, displacement and date of enumeration.  
Thus, in accordance with theories on media and anxiety, we find that those who are able 
to better receive Yambio FM’s broadcasts are more afraid of the LRA, regardless of 
what their own experience about the risk of an LRA attack tells them.  
Mechanisms: Yambio FM and Fear 
Now that we have established that the relationship between reception of Yambio FM 
and fear of the LRA is reasonably robust, we turn to the mechanisms connecting media 
and fear. Because the processes described by the costly information and availability 
mechanisms may be mostly subconscious, we cannot definitively rule out either 
mechanism. However, interview data provide suggestive evidence in favour of the 
availability mechanism.  
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We have already seen that interview respondents in areas with above median radio 
reception were very specific about instances when they had experienced fear of the LRA: 
when going across the border to the market, when going to cultivate, when making 
decisions on whether to return to their original village after having fled. Respondents in 
areas with below median radio reception did not bring up such specific examples. This 
appears to be more consistent with the availability mechanism, hypothesizing that media 
coverage of a phenomenon makes it easier for people to recall similar instances and that 
they therefore judge them to be more likely. It is not obviously consistent with the costly 
information mechanism. 
Judging how well-informed they felt, people in areas with above median radio reception 
were rather reluctant to characterise radio as a solid means of communication and 
information gathering. Interview respondents in semi-structured interviews expressed 
mistrust about information broadcasted. When asked how radio reception helped them 
in being informed, one respondent in an area with above median radio reception was 
reluctant to credit the radio with much information value. By way of example, he said 
that he had heard that the Americans were sending 200 or 100 military personnel, and 
that they were stationed in the nearby town of Nzara, ‘but we have not seen them.’11 The 
information about foreign troops only became valuable to him after he was connected to 
the troops through a personal contact. A disconnect between what people heard on the 
radio and their experience of the situation was often described: ‘We just heard of [the 
Ugandan army] by the roadside and we heard on radio about other soldiers. But we have 
not seen them. There is no evidence. How do you prove they are there?’12 
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Respondents in areas with above median radio reception indicated that they actively 
sought out information from other sources, which they trust more. These included 
crossborder communication, hunters observing LRA tracks and border residents 
patrolling the forest.13 In a different area with above median radio reception, people had 
no expectation that they could rely on the radio for good information: ‘Nobody told us 
LRA is no longer in area, [that] we can come back. We make patrol to find out.’14 
Respondents in areas with below median radio reception also spoke about seeking out 
other sources of information, but statements to this effect were often coupled with 
expressions of resignation about living in information isolation: ‘We have limited idea 
about issues to do with Yambio, only our own boma.’15 It was noted that hearsay was 
abundant: ‘I heard through rumors that [US soldiers] came, very many and they took 
them by plane to the jungle to the LRA. But I don’t know how true it was.’16 Some 
respondents felt lack of information more acutely: ‘People are always complaining that 
the government is neglecting us and not giving any information. It is true, there is 
nothing here to show the presence of the government.’17 Respondents also spoke about 
gathering bits of information when travelling to the state capital: ‘I was in Yambio when 
I heard about AU forces. I have seen UN forces in Yambio, but there is no other 
news.’18 
Interviews suggest that people in areas with above median radio reception put little trust 
in information received over the radio and actively seek out other sources of 
information. This does not square well with the costly information mechanism, which 
suggests that individuals use information received over the radio as a shorthand indicator 
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for risk because seeking out additional information is too costly. The vivid description of 
the reasons for fear in areas with above median radio reception appears most consistent 
with the availability mechanism.  
Fear and political attitudes: changing social and political structures 
Main results 
In this section, we examine how fear of the LRA contributes to changing political and 
social structures. Fear, increased by access to Yambio FM, influences social and political 
structures in Ezo and Tambura Counties. We find that because authorities such as the 
SPLA, or the government in general, were not seen to be acting on the perceived risk—
or at times seen to be perpetuating a situation of insecurity and uncertainty—our 
respondents’ reliance on existing government authority decreased. In response to this, a 
local militia called the arrow boys emerged as the counterpoint to official actors, who in 
the eyes of many respondents provide a more credible response to the security threat 
posed by the LRA. Respondents in areas with better radio reception, and consequent 
higher fear of the LRA, rely more on the arrow boys and less on the SPLA compared to 
respondents in areas with less access to Yambio FM. 
Respondents expected information on LRA presence broadcast over the radio, which 
they perceive as ‘official’ information, to elicit a protection response from official actors. 
However, in respondents’ experience this did not happen. The action taken by the 
official armed actors is regarded as limited. Lack of protection for the affected civilian 
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population has been a well-documented problem with the LRA presence in South 
Sudan, CAR and DRC (Schomerus and Tumutegyereize, 2009; Atkinson et al., 2012; 
Schomerus and de Vries, 2014) so people’s observation that nobody acts on the 
information about LRA presence is a fair judgment. Many respondents explained how 
they had reported information on LRA movement to government or SPLA to no avail. 
Based on repeated experiences that no appropriate action was taken by official actors, we 
found during qualitative interviews a notable sentiment that civilians were being used as 
a pawn or deliberately neglected.  
A typical response came from a man in a payam centre: ‘What is really our doubt is: we 
don’t know to what extent our government has gone to solve the problem. That’s why 
we are still hiding here.’19 Another man explained: ‘When [there was a] high rate of LRA 
activities, the government knew very well that LRA was killing civilians, but they did not 
send security forces….There might be a policy behind the government acting this way. 
We asked that question. We failed to understand this problem…So finally it was the 
youth who are defending the community.’20  
The ‘youth’ this respondent refers to are the civilian militia called the arrow boys, which 
emerged as a new authority due to their visible action against the LRA. In the eyes of 
civilians, the legitimacy of actors hinges on plausibly linking information dispensed and 
actions taken. Since both the armed forces are seen as inactive, the trust in official actors 
is rapidly diminished by the mismatch of information and action. This creates a gap, 
which others actors—in this case the arrow boys—fill.  
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The history of the WES ‘youth’ defense groups starts when the local population was 
under intercommunal pressure and the LRA arrived in 2005; a partial result of the 
intercommunal tensions was that the SPLA showed little interest in protecting civilians. 
When the LRA launched a new series of attacks after a 2008 military intervention on 
their camp across the border in DRC, members of the community in Maridi—a county 
east of Yambio—mobilised as a protection militia. Having expanded into other 
communities, an increased number of these groups of civilians started patrolling the 
roads and the bush for LRA movement from 2009 onwards (Schomerus and 
Tumutegyereize, 2009; Koos, 2014; Schomerus and De Vries, 2014; Schomerus, 2015; 
Schomerus and Rigterink, 2016).  
In qualitative interviews it became clear that the name arrow boys obscures that women 
and adults also join. The membership swells when there is information about possible 
LRA movement or other security threats, making it difficult to state numbers with 
certainty. One respondent estimated that ‘arrow boys and girls are more than 40 per cent 
of the population.’21 Our survey results suggest that this is realistic. Of 425 respondents, 
209 indicate that they themselves or at least one member of their household had been a 
member of the arrow boys in the previous 12 months. Given an average adult household 
size of three, this would put arrow boy membership anywhere between 16 and 50 per 
cent of the population. 
The arrow boys are seen as more effective in dealing with the (perceived) threat of the 
LRA, compared to the SPLA and the government for a number of reasons. First, the 
arrow boys were seen as taking fast and reliable action in the face of (perceived) security 
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threats. ‘These guys are going to the bush to see if there are footmarks by the LRA. If 
they don’t see, they can tell people’ was how one resident summed up this up.22 A 
member of a women’s group explained: ‘In case of insecurity, the people who do most 
of the protection are the arrow boys. Because we don’t have any other solution for 
insecurity, this is a good solution.’23 A representative of a women’s group explained why 
for her, the youth (which she named as being synonymous with the arrow boys) now 
represent the only trustworthy authority:  
‘I prefer to go to the youth with a problem because youth are very fast 
at making decisions. One example is LRA: There was a recent attack, 
and the information was circulated. And the arrow boys were the first 
group to follow them. The youth crossed past my house and said: ‘This 
mama, we cannot leave her alone.’ So some stayed behind to give me 
protection.’24  
It is worth noting that despite the fact that many respondents outlined how the arrow 
boys had followed LRA footsteps and chased them away, most of these events had 
occurred a while back or had not been confirmed as attacks. However, the arrow boys 
continued to follow up rumours of LRA movement.  
The credibility of the SPLA in the eyes of the population is further undermined, and that 
of the arrow boys bolstered, by the dynamics between these two actors. Having 
observed the SPLA not offering protection and not acting on information about LRA 
presence, the soldiers are considered an impediment to the arrow boys, with numerous 
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interviewees reporting how the SPLA refused cooperation. ‘There were even accusations 
that the SPLA fought the arrow boys,’ explained a woman. ‘But the arrow boys were 
brought up by the community to protect the community. That [should have been] the 
work of the SPLA. So people even accuse the government [of actively contributing to 
the community’s lack of security].’25 A typical story of how the SPLA interacts with 
arrow boys came from a group of arrow boys based in a remote village. They explained 
that they deliberately do not inform the SPLA because in 2011 the SPLA told the arrow 
boys to split up and go into the bush in two directions. The SPLA then changed 
direction to shoot at the arrow boys. One arrow boy was reportedly injured.26 A woman 
gave an example of how government officials are seen to manipulate information, and 
how this creates distrust. She explained that the former WES governor had publicly 
denied the presence of the LRA in the state and dismissed the arrow boys’ importance: 
‘A representative of the president! So people felt so marginalised….And she even said 
citizens should not take a spear.’27  
Overall, qualitative findings suggest that fear of the LRA contributes to more favorable 
political attitudes toward the arrow boys, but more negative political attitudes towards 
the SPLA. 
Table 5 below examines the relationship between fear of the LRA and political attitudes 
using the quantitative data, showing results from estimating models (2) and (3). 
Table 5: Reception of Yambio FM and political attitudes 
__________________ 
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Table 5 here 
__________________ 
The results in table 5 provide support for our qualitative findings, although this is not 
consistent across all indicators. The results in column (3) and (4) are strongest: in areas 
with more fear of the LRA (as predicted by boma radio reception) respondents are 
significantly more likely to say they would turn to the arrow boys when fearing for their 
safety and significantly less likely to say they would turn to the SPLA. This effect is again 
substantial in size: a move from the lowest to the highest degree of reception of Yambio 
FM in the sample, with all control variables at their mean levels, is associated with an 
increase in the probability that a respondent would go to the arrow boys for protection 
from 22.35 per cent to 41.89 per cent. It is also associated with a decrease in the 
probability that a respondent would go to the SPLA for protection from 57.34 per cent 
to 0.16 per cent.  
The signs on the coefficients of interest in the remaining columns of table 5 is consistent 
with the qualitative findings. Columns (1) and (2) would suggest that respondents in 
areas with better access to Yambio FM are more likely to have actually reported 
concerns to the arrow boys and less likely to report to the SPLA, but the coefficient is 
only significant for the SPLA. Signs in columns (5) and (6) are again consistent, but 
using trust as an indicator of political attitudes, neither coefficient on fear of the LRA is 
significant. The online appendix shows that some similar results are obtained for a 
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model using individual radio reception including boma fixed effects, although again 
results are not consistent across indicators of political attitudes. 
It is further noteworthy that few of the control variables appear to be systematically 
related to the political attitudes under investigation. One exception is age: older 
respondents appear significantly less likely to have a political attitude favouring the arrow 
boys, whereas they are more likely to have a positive attitude vis-à-vis the SPLA. It is 
possible to consider that older respondents better remember the SPLA as rebels fighting 
the government of northern Sudan, thus associating South Sudan’s independence more 
strongly with the SPLA. 
In sum, qualitative and quantitative results suggest that fear of the LRA, partially 
explained by exposure to Yambio FM, is associated with more positive political attitudes 
towards the arrow boys, and more negative political attitudes vis-à-vis the SPLA. 
Quantitative results, however, are not consistent across all indicators. 
Fear and political attitudes: mechanisms 
Two theoretical mechanisms explaining the connection between anxiety and political 
attitudes were proposed: Affect Transfer and Affective Intelligence. Negative feelings 
related to the LRA may directly transfer to political actors positively or negatively 
associated with the LRA (Affect Transfer), or anxious individuals may make a greater 
cognitive effort to form a political opinion, instead of relying on habit or patriotism 
(Affective Intelligence). To distinguish between these two mechanisms, we again turn to 
the qualitative interviews.  
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In areas with above median radio reception, people often stressed that participation in 
the arrow boys came with great sacrifices in the short term—no food or water in the 
bush, long walks in pursuit of footprints, risk of being killed—and long term with 
regards to loss of vocational or educational opportunities for themselves or their 
children, since loss of income also means not being able to pay school fees. In these 
areas, the arrow boys were directly linked to the LRA phenomenon.28  
Often the actions of the arrow boys were contrasted with those of the SPLA or the 
government, with the terms SPLA and government often used interchangeably. Both 
SPLA and government were portrayed as actively refusing to help people, as summed up 
by one respondent in his narrative of how the arrow boys came about: ‘All chiefs called 
for a meeting and advised youth that they needed to defend themselves. Otherwise they 
were all going to die and government was not coming to help them.’29 One respondent 
recounted his experience with the government army: ‘It has never happened that the 
SPLA has followed the LRA into the bush.’30 
In areas with below median radio reception, support for the arrow boys in interviews 
appeared equally strong as in areas with above median radio reception. Yet in stark 
contrast many functions for the arrow boys were proposed, some actual and some 
imagined for the future. One of these functions suggested was as a permanent protection 
force against future attacks by other groups—which are often seen and described in 
antagonistic terms using ethnicity: ‘The other reason for keeping the arrow boys around 
is for Dinka tribe. Because these are not rational people and they are looking to fight.’31 
One arrow boy described the function of his group for the community: ‘They are 
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soldiers, police in the community. There is no government.’32 Or as one arrow boy 
phrased the desire of the population to have the arrow boys in a permanent position of 
authority it: ‘People want to stay with arrow boys.’33 It was proposed that they could 
become the personal force or militia of the proposed Zande King: ‘[The arrow boys] will 
keep the group and if the king is crowned, they will turn into the militia of the king to 
protect the community.’34 
The above suggests that respondents in areas with above median reception of Yambio 
FM expressed more clearly in interviews what the arrow boys were presently doing, and 
linked their attitudes about the SPLA to information obtained through observation. In 
areas with above median reception of Yambio FM, the envisioned tasks of the arrow 
boys were broader and less well-defined and positive attitudes versus the arrow boys 
were expressed without accompanying information on their actions. Overall, it would 
appear that respondents in areas with better reception of Yambio FM, and consequently 
with higher fear of the LRA, base their political attitudes on more concrete information. 
This would be consistent with the Affective Intelligence mechanism, but is hard to 
square with Affect Transfer. 
Changing the community structure 
South Sudan has struggled as a centrally-governed state, both prior to and after 
independence. On the state level, alienation from the central government has been a 
regularly expressed sentiment. In WES, where general alienation from the SPLM/A has 
become further focussed through the LRA issue, the trust invested in the arrow boys has 
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become a general counterpoint to what is perceived to be a hostile regime. The crucial 
shift is that the arrow boys have gradually also taken on societal functions that ought to 
fall under the remit of other state actors. These include judiciary or law enforcement 
tasks that reach well beyond the tasks of a protection militia. 
Through the protection work, explained one respondent, the arrow boys had earned a 
permanent place in the community. ‘In a situation where LRA is not there, the 
government should keep arrow boys to guard the area like a police man. The 
government needs to look at a way to keep the arrow boys busy… they have helped the 
community and government a lot.’35  
One community leader explained the relationship between the formal government 
officials and those holding authority within the community: ‘When there is any decision 
to be taken, the payam administrator calls the chief, the youth, the arrow boys.’36 Another 
respondent explained: ‘When there is a problem in the community and the court is not 
aware of it, the arrow boys will alert the court to that issue.’37 Asked to whom she would 
turn with a community or personal safety issue, one woman explained: ‘The last person 
to go to with a problem is the payam administrator because he only takes information 
from arrow boys and police. So I would go to arrow boys and police first.’38 
Representatives of another community argued that even with no LRA attacks reported 
or to be expected, ‘It’s good to maintain the arrow boys. They know all their borders. If 
something is happening, they can inform the government.’39 Another chief explained 
that the arrow boys should also be ‘responsible for home guards in areas where army 
cannot reach.’40  
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The arrow boys’ authority leaves a number of loose ends. One respondent, who holds a 
leadership position in the community, explained: ‘If the situation is now [calm], there is 
no LRA, I’m trying to have an institution to train [the arrow boys], transform them to 
normal citizens. We can train them in carpentry, because if you leave them like this they 
can even turn against the community. What will happen? Who will they be? Will they be 
good citizens?’41  
Conclusion 
We aimed to investigate the impact of access to media, specifically Yambio FM, on 
individual perceptions of security, and on political attitudes. We conclude that people 
with better reception of Yambio FM express greater anxiety regarding their security 
situation, regardless of whether or not the security information they hear matches their 
experience of the situation. Thus improved access to media is found to increase fear, 
decrease reliance on official actors and strengthen reliance on a civilian militia. We can 
see a contribution of media to the altering of community structures with a profound 
impact on the social fabric of WES. We provide evidence for a fear-inducing effect of 
media, and for the impact of anxiety on political attitudes in the context of a developing 
and conflict-affected country. Furthermore, we distinguish between various theoretical 
mechanisms explaining these relationships, finding suggestive evidence in favour of 
Availability and Affective Intelligence respectively. That these heuristic responses to 
information possibly exist implies that policies focused on media and information may 
have unexpected and unintended consequences.  
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Assessing unintended consequences of ‘come home’ messages appears especially 
important given that one of the NGOs working on this recommends making ‘come 
home’ messages more effective by increasing their reach and frequency. We cannot show 
that increased fear and the resulting contribution to changing authority structures is due 
to ‘come home’ messages specifically. However, if an instinctive response to the lack of 
access to security information is to increase its frequency—regardless of the level of 
security threats—the phenomena examined in this paper might be magnified.  
Our findings suggest an urgent need for empirical investigation of the role of media in 
situations of violence conflict. The media's function as a peacebuilding and statebuilding 
tool needs research with a focus on the intersection of information and action. To the 
extent that we believe that increasing reliance on the arrow boys and decreasing reliance 
on the state army is the opposite of statebuilding, we provide evidence from one case 
suggesting media does decidedly not contribute to how statebuilding is generally 
understood. The role information plays in forming authority, as well as in influencing 
social and political structures in areas with limited state capacity remains unclear. If 
media's aim is, as stated by BBC Media Action, to support self governance, then the lack 
of understanding of these links is dramatic. As we have seen in Ezo and Tambura 
Counties, such self governance might follow unexpected patterns and create new realities 
for ordinary citizens who are exposed to media.  
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Anouk S. Rigterink is a research officer at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science. Houghton Street. London WC2A 2AE, UK. a.s.rigterink@lse.ac.uk. 
2 Formerly an assistant professorial research fellow at the LSE, Mareike Schomerus is 
now a research fellow at the Overseas Development Institute (odi). 203 Blackfriars 
Road, London SE1 8NJ, UK. ms@mareike.net. 
3 For a comprehensive introduction to the LRA rebellion from a number of angles, see 
Allen, T. and Vlassenroot, K. (2010). The Lord's Resistance Army : myth and reality London: 
Zed..  
4 International aid worker, Ezo, 2013 
5 Community meeting, Tambura, 2013 
6 International aid worker, Ezo Town, 2013 
7 Women's Group, Tambura, 2013 
8 Community meeting, Tambura, 2013 
9 Executive Chief, Ezo, 2013. 
10 payam chief, Tambura, 2013. 
11 Executive Chief, Ezo, 2013. 
12 Women's Group, Ezo, 2013 
13 Arrow Boys, Ezo, 2013 
14 Community meeting, Ezo, 2013 
15Community meeting, Ezo, 2013 
16 Woman interviewee, Ezo, 2013 
17Woman interviewee, Ezo, 2013 
18Community meeting, Ezo, 2013 
19 Chief, Ezo, 2013. 
20 Male in his 30s, Tambura, 2013 
21 Senior chief, Yambio, 2012 
22 Community meeting, Ezo, 2013. 
23 Women’s association, Tambura, 2013 
24 Chairperson women’s association, Tambura, 2013 
25 Religious sister, Tambura, 2013 
26 Arrow boys, Ezo, 2013 
27 Religious sister, Tambura, 2013 
28 Executive Chief, Ezo, 2013 
29 Executive Chief, Ezo, 2013 
30Arrow Boys, Tambura, 2013 
31 payam chief, Tambura, 2013 
32 Arrow Boys, Tambura, 2013 
33 Three young men, Tambura, 2013 
34 Arrow Boys, Tambura, 2013. See also Schomerus and Rigterink, 2016. 
35 Youth group, Tambura, 2013 
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36 Spiritual leader, Ezo, 2013 
37 Chief, Tambura, 2013 
38 Chairperson women’s association, Tambura, 2013 
39 Community meeting, Ezo, 2013 
40 Chief, Ezo, 2013 
41 Chief, Tambura, 2013 
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Online Appendix 
The fear factor is a main thing: How radio influences 
anxiety and political attitudes 
Anouk S. Rigterink and Mareike Schomerus 
Individual model 
Method 
We estimate the following model using individual level reception of Yambio FM:  
𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅𝐿𝑅𝐴𝑏𝑖 =  𝛼𝑏 + ß1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖 +  ß𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖    
 (A1) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 𝑅𝑅𝑖is individual radio reception, an indicator equalling one if the 
respondent’s household has a working radio that can receive Yambio FM. Note that this 
specification includes boma fixed effects, which makes including the 𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑪𝑬𝒃 
vector obsolete. 
Model (A1) has the advantage of allowing the inclusion of boma-fixed effects, capturing 
any time-invariant boma-specific factors related to both fear of the LRA and individual 
radio reception that may bias the estimate of ß1. However, this specification disregards 
the main source of variation (between bomas) and spill-over effects are likely strong 
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within the boma, biasing the estimate of ß1 downwards. Furthermore, note that Model 
(A1) introduces a new source of endogeneity, since households that decide to buy a 
radio may be systematically different from those that do not. Model (A1) requires an 
ordered logit or probit model with fixed effects.  
However, both ordered logit and ordered probit are maximum likelihood estimators, and 
maximum likelihood cannot consistently estimate parameters in finite samples in the 
presence of fixed effects (Lancaster, 2009) (Colin Cameron and Miller, 2013). Therefore, 
we use the ‘Blow-Up and Cluster’ ordered logit estimator (bucologit) 
(Baetschmann,Staub and Winkelmann, 2011). The idea underlying this estimator is that a 
fixed effects logit model (with a dichotomous dependent variable) can be estimated 
consistently using conditional maximum likelihood estimation (CML) (Chamberlain, 
1979). One could simply transform the ordinal variable into a dichotomous one - using 
some cut-off point - and estimate by CML, but this would not use all available 
information, and would thus be inefficient. One alternative is to estimate results for 
every possible cut-off point and then combine these estimates. The bucologit estimator 
does both in a single step, by replacing every observation by as many copies of itself as 
there are possible cut-off points and estimating CML on the thus expanded sample. In 
the context of our four-point scale, this implies that observations for villages in which 
responses vary across the full scale are duplicated three times, observations for villages in 
which respondents’ answers do not use one extreme of the scale are duplicated twice, 
etc. Bomas in which all respondents gave the same answer contain no within-boma 
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variation and are dropped (for 𝐹𝐸𝐴𝑅 𝐿𝑅𝐴, this applies to one boma). Beatschmann et 
al. (2011) show that the bucologit estimator is theoretically consistent, that it is never 
outperformed by other commonly used consistent estimators and outperforms the latter 
in small samples (Baetschmann et al., 2011). 
We investigate the impact of individual level radio reception on political attitudes using 
the following models: 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐵𝑂𝑌𝑆𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼𝑏 + ß1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖 + ß𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖  
 (A2) 
𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐴𝑏𝑖 = 𝛼𝑏 + ß1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑖 + ß𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜀𝑏𝑖    
 (A3) 
Because of the difficulties in estimating an IV model with fixed effects and an ordinal or 
dichotomous dependent variable, we estimate a reduced form, including radio reception 
in the model directly. These models will be estimated by bucologit estimator for 
dependent variables measured on an ordinal scale and by logit estimator with fixed 
effects for dichotomous ones. 
Results 
Table A1 presents the results on radio and fear from individual model (A1). As 
highlighted before, this exploits within-boma variation in ability to receive Yambio FM 
only, and as such is a more stringent test of the hypothesis. Using this model, we fail to 
find evidence that exposure to Yambio FM increases fear: the coefficient on individual 
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radio reception is positive, yet statistically insignificant for any of the indicators of fear 
used.  
Table A1: Radio and fear individual model 
________________________ 
Table A1 here 
_______________________ 
Table A2 presents the results for a reduced form individual model (A2 and A3), with 
boma fixed effects. Note that the number of observations is substantially lower for 
columns (2) and (4). This is because reporting an issue to the SPLA, and a respondent 
saying that he/she would go to the SPLA for protection are rare. In six and two bomas 
respectively, this did not occur at all, and there is no within-boma variation to exploit. 
These bomas are dropped from the relevant regressions.  
Table A2: Radio and political attitudes individual model 
________________________ 
Table A2 here 
_______________________ 
In the case of the relationship between Yambio FM and fear, the model using individual 
radio reception failed to reproduce the results obtained using boma radio reception. In 
this case, however, some similar results are found. Respondents with individual access to 
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Yambio FM brought significantly more issues to the Arrow Boys in the past year, and 
are significantly more likely to (hypothetically) go to the Arrow Boys for protection. The 
equivalent coefficients for the SPLA have the expected sign, but are not significant (the 
loss of observations likely contributes to this). No support for the hypothesis presented 
is found for the trust variables. 
Robustness checks 
Distance to border, phone ownership, migration and date-of-interview fixed 
effects 
Table A3 addressed a number of other potential concerns regarding the robustness of 
the relationship between reception of Yambio FM and fear of the LRA. We omit the 
coefficients on the control variables for brevity.  
Table A3: Robustness checks 
 
________________________ 
Table A3 here 
_______________________ 
One such concern may be that radio coverage is better in bomas closer to the border with 
either DRC or CAR, and that inhabitants of these bomas are also more afraid of the LRA, 
either because the LRA is closer to them or because they feel more isolated. Therefore, 
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columns (1) and (2) of Table A3 include the straight-line distance from the boma to the 
DRC and CAR border respectively as control variables. Controlling for distance to the 
CAR border causes the coefficient on boma radio reception to decrease slightly in size. 
However, it is still significant at the ten per cent level. Controlling for distance to the 
DRC border does not meaningfully change our baseline results.  
Column (3) of Table A3 investigates phone coverage. We may imagine that phone and 
radio coverage are correlated, and that information on the LRA received over the phone 
may be the actual driver of fear, rather than radio. Column (3) takes the number of 
phones owned in a boma as a proxy for the quality of phone coverage, since inhabitants 
of bomas without coverage are less likely to own a phone. Column (3) does not provide 
evidence that the observed relationship between boma radio reception and fear of the 
LRA is driven by phone coverage.  
Another cause for concern may be displacement. Ezo and Tambura Counties have 
experienced high rates of displacement. It is possible that areas with better radio 
coverage experienced higher rates of displacement, and that those who have been 
displaced experience higher levels of fear, even after returning to their original place of 
residence. Alternatively, those who fear the LRA more intensely may have moved to 
places with better radio reception, perhaps because they think they can protect 
themselves better there. Out of these two explanations, the first appears most likely: our 
data indicates that out of the 60 per cent of respondents that indicate they have been 
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displaced, more than 50 per cent now live at their original place of residence, whereas 
less than 10 per cent moved somewhere else.  
Column (4) of Table A3 includes an indicator equaling one if the respondent is a 
continuous (non-displaced) resident of the boma. Column (5) includes an indicator 
equaling one if the respondent has moved to the boma from somewhere else. Coefficients 
on both indicators have the expected sign. However, our original results are robust to 
including both indicators, suggesting that our results are not driven by displacement.  
Furthermore, one may be concerned that the results are somehow driven by higher 
numbers of minorities living in areas with better radio reception. Column (6) of Table 
A3 shows our baseline regression, excluding respondents that do not have South 
Sudanese nationality, or that indicate that they do not speak Pazande as their first 
language. As may be evident, respondents to our survey are very homogenous, and only 
27 individuals are excluded. This does not affect the original results.  
It should also be noted that on or around 25 April 2013, Yambio FM temporarily 
stopped broadcasting due to a defective transmitter. It resumed broadcasting roughly 
three months later. The breakdown took place shortly before the start of survey data 
collection, in May 2013. This may have affected the research, either by influencing the 
measurement of the quality of radio reception, or because of a waning impact of Yambio 
FM after the temporary stop. We deem both unlikely. First, the question ‘can your radio 
receive Yambio FM’ was framed in general terms, making it unlikely that respondents 
would have answered ‘no’ purely because they were temporarily unable to receive Yambio 
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FM. Indeed, reported ability to receive Yambio FM is high for all bomas visited. Second, 
all data was gathered over the course of the month immediately following Yambio FM’s 
breakdown, a period likely too short to expect its impact to disappear entirely. It is 
important to realize that this should bias our results downward. Hence any impact of 
Yambio FM found in our analysis could be considered a lower bound to its true impact 
when fully operational. The temporary stop in broadcasting might bias our results, if 
respondents in bomas the survey team visited at a later date – and longer after the 
temporary stop - were more likely report they could not receive Yambio FM and more 
afraid of the LRA. The mitigate these concerns, we present a specification including 
date-of-enumeration fixed effects. Column (7) of Table A3 shows that including date-of-
enumeration fixed effects has no meaningful effect on the coefficient of interest. 
Presence of security forces 
One may suspect that armed forces provide better protection against an LRA attack to 
inhabitants of bomas with poor radio reception. This is slightly counterintuitive: it is 
perhaps more logical to suspect that bomas that are more easily reached by a radio signal 
are also more easily reached by armed forces. However, there may be some logic to the 
argument if armed forces focus their protection efforts on remote or difficult to reach 
areas.  
We deem this implausible; first of all because we have seen no evidence that other armed 
forces have a greater presence in remote areas. Quite the reverse: the largest bases of the 
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UN or the SPLA are near the county capitals. Furthermore, interviews suggest that 
armed forces such as the UN, the SPLA and the UPDF are perceived as ineffective in 
providing protection against the LRA.  
Nevertheless, Table A4 shows our baseline specification, including five indicators for 
whether the respondent has seen US, UN, AU, SPLA or UPDF soldiers respectively, in 
the past year. Confirming information obtained through interviews, none of these 
indicators is significantly related to fear of the LRA. Controlling for these indicators has 
little to no effect on the coefficient for boma radio reception: our results appear robust to 
controlling for the presence of other armed forces. 
Table A4: Controlling for presence of other armed forces 
 
________________________ 
Table A4 here 
_______________________ 
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Figure 1: relevant questions from survey in Ezo and Tambura counties, WES 
 
Question Scale 
  
Radio 
Owns working radio 
‘Do you or a member of your household own a radio that 
works?’  
 
Boma radio reception 
IF YES: can your radio receive Yambio FM? 
[From January/February 2015 survey]: 
IF YES: can your radio receive Miraya FM? 
Dichotomous 
(yes, no) 
 
 
Percentage 
(100 minus percentage 
of radio owners in 
boma unable to receive 
Yambio FM / Miraya 
FM) 
  
Fear  
Fear LRA 
‘In the past year, how often did you fear that the LRA would 
come and attack your village?’ 
4-point (never, rarely, 
sometimes, often) 
Fear to travel between villages / Fear to go to field 
‘In the past month, did you do any of the following activities: 
travel between villages at night, go to your field at night?  
IF YES: Did you feel safe doing so? [no indicates fear] 
IF NO: Did you not do so because this is unsafe?’[yes 
indicates fear] 
Dichotomous indicator 
of fear equalling 1 if the 
respondent did the 
activity, but felt unsafe, 
or do not do the 
activity because it was 
unsafe, and 0 otherwise. 
  
Political attitudes  
Trust arrow boys / SPLA 
‘How often do you trust [the arrow boys/SPLA]?’ 
Dichotomous (1 for 
always and most of the 
time, 0 for rarely and 
never).  
Would go for protection to arrow boys / SPLA 
‘When you are afraid to be harmed by someone outside your 
family, who would you turn to, to get protection?’  
Dichotomous 
(arrow boys / SPLA 
mentioned or not) 
Brought issue in front of arrow boys / SPLA 
‘In the last 12 months, did you report an issue or concern to 
[the arrow boys/SPLA]?’ 
Dichotomous 
(yes, no) 
  
Experience of LRA violence Continuous 
Years since last (personal) LRA victim in boma 
‘During your lifetime, did any of the following happen to you’? 
IF YES: ‘In which year’, ‘By whom?’ 
1. Member of immediate family killed 
2. Injured or maimed in an attack / crossfire? (personal) 
3. House burned down or destroyed? (personal) 
4. Abducted? (personal) 
5. A family member abducted? 
Years since respondent 
then resident in boma 
reported being victim 
of LRA violence 
(personally) 
  
 
  
Figure 2: Ability to receive Yambio FM
 
  
  
   
Table 1: Correlation between residual radio reception and LRA activity 
A: Distance to closest LRA 
incident… 
  B: Average distance to the 10 
closest LRA incidents… 
  C:Other boma 
characteristics     
                
in the last year -0.0317   in the last year -0.0525   Years since last 
LRA victim in 
boma 
0.0349 
(0.9306)   (0.8856)   (0.9238) 
                
in the last year, 
involving civilians 
-0.0513   in the last year, 
involving civilians 
-0.0407   Distance to 
border CAR 
-0.084 
(0.8881)   (0.9112)   (0.8174) 
                
in the last 2 years 0.0569   in the last 2 years -0.0688   Distance to 
border DRC 
0.06 
(0.8759)   (0.8503)   (0.8693) 
                
in the last 2 years, 
involving civilians 
-0.0252   in the last 2 years, 
involving civilians 
-0.0287       
(0.9449)   (0.9373)       
                
in the last 5 years 0.4234   in the last 5 years 0.1539   
 𝑝-values in parenthesis. 
Significance: * 10% level, 
 ** 5% level, *** 1% level  
  
(0.2228)   (0.6713)   
            
in the last 5 years, 
involving civilians 
0.2425   in the last 5 years, 
involving civilians 
0.0956   
(0.4996)   (0.7928)   
 
 
  
Table 2: Correlation between boma radio reception and observable individual and household characteristics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Number of 
huts in 
compound 
Number of 
goats /sheep 
owned by 
household 
Number of 
poultry owned by 
household 
Number of 
bicycles owned 
by household 
Household 
owns 
working 
radio 
(indicator) 
 
Age Years of 
education 
Gender 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit OLS OLS Probit 
         
Boma radio reception 0.00723 -0.0113 0.101 0.00336 0.219 3.892 -0.166 1.158* 
 (0.00700) (0.0291) (0.0872) (0.00431) (0.711) (6.683) (0.176) (0.678) 
Distance to Yambio -0.198*** 0.621** 0.854 -0.00643 -0.433 -50.90 -1.281 -13.81* 
 (0.0734) (0.305) (0.915) (0.0452) (7.417) (70.64) (1.864) (7.185) 
Distance to Ezo -0.229*** 0.251 -0.0364 0.00974 -5.827 -33.49 -0.684 -8.097* 
 (0.0449) (0.187) (0.560) (0.0277) (4.482) (43.22) (1.141) (4.338) 
Distance to Tambura -0.215** 0.575 0.705 0.00191 5.567 10.87 -1.669 -9.570 
 (0.100) (0.417) (1.248) (0.0617) (10.03) (96.08) (2.536) (9.829) 
Number of adults  0.00232*** 0.00334*** 0.0141*** 0.000841*** 0.0494*    
  in household (0.000264) (0.00110) (0.00329) (0.000162) (0.0263)    
Number of children  0.00383*** 0.00672*** 0.0181*** 0.00141*** 0.149***    
  in household (0.000401) (0.00167) (0.00499) (0.000247) (0.0402)    
         
Constant 0.0511*** -0.116** -0.219 -0.00108 -1.320 41.59*** 0.772** 1.514 
 (0.0130) (0.0540) (0.162) (0.00800) (1.352) (12.38) (0.327) (1.249) 
         
Observations 433 433 433 433 429 433 433 433 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 3: Reception of Yambio FM and fear 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Fear LRA Fear LRA Fear LRA Fears to 
travel 
between 
villages 
Fears to 
go to field 
 oprobit ologit oprobit probit probit 
      
Boma radio reception 2.676** 5.072**  0.743* 1.970*** 
 (1.236) (2.564)  (0.406) (0.531) 
Boma reception    -3.897**   
  of radio Miraya FM   (1.644)   
Distance to Yambio -10.10 -27.33 -11.19 -1.632 -1.788 
 (14.36) (30.01) (12.77) (4.749) (4.176) 
Distance to Ezo -11.55** -20.68** -31.59** -13.58*** -18.62*** 
 (5.603) (10.11) (13.48) (1.992) (3.191) 
Distance to Tambura -13.55 -36.18 5.791 -0.227 3.056 
 (19.54) (40.97) (10.97) (4.904) (4.773) 
Gender 0.113 0.101 0.0225 -0.279* -0.612*** 
 (0.102) (0.218) (0.0897) (0.150) (0.122) 
Age 0.905* 0.0162* 0.00989* 0.638 0.122 
 (0.549) (0.00938) (0.00561) (0.492) (0.475) 
Years of education -0.502* -0.793 -0.392 -0.251 -0.0762 
 (0.272) (0.549) (0.275) (0.164) (0.238) 
Number of adults  -0.140 -0.258 -0.122 0.00669 -0.0418 
  in household (0.0905) (0.164) (0.0934) (0.0671) (0.0545) 
Number of children  0.0973*** 0.171*** 0.0934*** 0.0379 0.0347 
  in household (0.0311) (0.0620) (0.0332) (0.0280) (0.0301) 
Number of huts  8.119 16.71 8.187 -9.233** 0.169 
  in compound (9.507) (17.59) (10.16) (4.696) (4.705) 
Number of poultry  0.146 0.288 0.350 -0.0776 -0.253 
  owned by household (0.500) (0.960) (0.503) (0.479) (0.451) 
Number of goats/sheep 0.483 0.680 0.0590 -0.925 -0.291 
  owned by household (1.123) (2.228) (0.950) (1.417) (1.616) 
Number of bicycles -4.021 -11.15 -4.449 7.294 6.281 
  owned by household (8.321) (14.54) (8.354) (12.53) (13.14) 
Owns working radio -0.175** -0.342** -0.155** 0.0983 0.0893 
  (indicator) (0.0790) (0.146) (0.0686) (0.226) (0.188) 
Constant    0.447 -0.406 
    (0.782) (1.044) 
      
Observations 423 423 427 427 425 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
Table 1: Controlling for LRA activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FEAR LRA oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit 
       
Boma radio reception 3.256*** 4.327*** 2.908 4.428** 4.932*** 4.390 
 (0.810) (0.886) (2.864) (2.220) (1.193) (2.762) 
       
Years since last LRA 
victim in boma 
0.339      
(0.231)      
       
Years since last personal 
LRA victim in boma 
 0.103     
 (0.0904)     
       
Distance to closest LRA-
related incident… 
      
Last year   -7.761*    
   (4.143)    
Last 2 years   5.093    
   (4.175)    
Last 5 years   -2.480    
   (7.821)    
Involving civilians  
last year 
    -3.177  
    (4.149)  
Involving civilians  
last 2 years  
    5.028**  
    (2.116)  
Involving civilians 
last 5 years 
    -6.928***  
    (1.514)  
       
Distance to 10 closest 
LRA-related incidents… 
      
Last year    -0.234   
    (0.766)   
Last 2 years    0.429   
    (0.522)   
Last 5 years    -0.654   
    (0.684)   
Involving civilians  
last year 
     0.478 
     (1.262) 
Involving civilians  
last 2 years  
     0.00104 
     (1.935) 
Involving civilians 
last 5 years 
     -0.774 
     (1.237) 
       
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 423 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
*** 𝑝<0.01, ** 𝑝<0.05, * 𝑝<0.1 
 
  
  
Table 5: Reception of Yambio FM and political attitudes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ivprobit ivprobit ivprobit probit ivprobit ivprobit 
    
   
Instrument: Boma 
radio reception 
Brought issue in front of Would go for protection 
to 
Trust in 
arrow boys SPLA arrow boys SPLA arrow boys SPLA 
       
       
Fear LRA 1.210 -2.046*** 1.582*** -2.132*** 1.198 -0.415 
 (1.095) (0.358) (0.398) (0.297) (1.107) (2.640) 
       
Distance to Yambio 11.34 -28.95* -7.172 4.685 -20.92** -22.79 
 (18.64) (16.58) (9.910) (7.402) (9.553) (19.81) 
Distance to Ezo 3.126 -5.980 7.810** -3.960 1.657 -22.80** 
 (6.089) (7.767) (3.880) (2.957) (6.124) (9.005) 
Distance to Tambura 9.445 -17.06 -11.89 9.286 -13.46 -9.878 
 (22.80) (16.48) (11.07) (8.554) (13.72) (25.72) 
Gender 0.134 0.258 -0.0358 0.0982 0.147 0.227 
 (0.284) (0.188) (0.153) (0.0981) (0.280) (0.206) 
Age -0.0180* 0.0142* -0.00511 0.00682** -0.0158*** 0.000512 
 (0.00974) (0.00839) (0.00433) (0.00343) (0.00537) (0.00910) 
Years of education 0.370 -0.277 0.437*** -0.259 0.301 -0.445 
 (0.301) (0.264) (0.169) (0.255) (0.220) (0.339) 
Number of adults 0.0768 -0.0873 0.0863 -0.0782 0.0400 -0.107 
in household (0.0893) (0.0838) (0.0721) (0.0679) (0.100) (0.155) 
Number of children 0.0861 0.107*** -0.0167 0.0574*** -0.0224 -0.0218 
in household (0.106) (0.0251) (0.0350) (0.0206) (0.0445) (0.0897) 
Number of huts  -17.01* -10.74* -2.333 4.507 -13.36* 10.95 
in compound (10.32) (6.099) (7.948) (6.437) (7.509) (12.22) 
Number of poultry  0.554 0.808** 0.432*** 0.0437 -0.168 -0.380 
owned by household (0.609) (0.380) (0.123) (0.267) (0.409) (0.376) 
Number of 
goats/sheep 
-0.765 1.644 -0.616 -0.203 0.407 -0.383 
owned by household (0.747) (1.412) (0.455) (1.275) (0.943) (1.065) 
Number of bicycles -32.88 -5.447 -18.13** 0.282 1.764 12.59 
owned by household (25.19) (11.23) (9.187) (5.937) (11.92) (12.39) 
Owns working radio 0.483 -0.211** 0.313** -0.0925 0.416* 0.0196 
(indicator) (0.342) (0.0937) (0.135) (0.0925) (0.218) (0.217) 
Constant -7.155*** 10.55*** -5.194** 6.626*** 0.564 5.873 
 (2.444) (2.657) (2.373) (1.187) (4.909) (8.254) 
       
Observations 423 423 414 414 415 417 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
Table A1: Radio and fear individual model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fear of LRA Fears to travel 
between villages 
Fears to go to 
field 
    
Individual radio reception 0.0138 0.176 0.0118 
 (0.244) (0.250) (0.262) 
Gender 0.0588 -0.424* -1.044*** 
 (0.155) (0.240) (0.261) 
Age 0.0129 0.0123 0.00345 
 (0.0112) (0.00885) (0.00923) 
Years of education -0.502 -0.389 0.0553 
 (0.423) (0.362) (0.380) 
Household composition adults -0.218 0.00544 -0.0438 
 (0.176) (0.0739) (0.0765) 
Household composition 
children 
0.185*** 0.0672 0.0620 
 (0.0611) (0.0480) (0.0495) 
Asset: number of houses 13.37 -14.33* 0.334 
 (16.90) (8.485) (8.773) 
Asset: number of poultry 0.626 -0.101 -0.206 
 (0.852) (0.659) (0.692) 
Asset: number of goats and 
sheep 
-0.686 -1.272 -0.623 
 (2.381) (2.181) (2.068) 
Asset: number of bicycles -19.32 8.725 4.480 
 (17.31) (13.86) (14.50) 
    
Observations 721 424 422 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
 
Table A2: Radio and political attitudes individual model 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 logit 
 
logit logit logit bucologit bucologit 
 Brought issue in front of Would go for protection to Trust in 
 Arrow Boys SPLA Arrow Boys SPLA Arrow Boys SPLA 
Individual radio reception 0.964** -0.919 0.629** -0.745 0.0254 0.282 
 (0.456) (1.731) (0.263) (0.748) (0.211) (0.255) 
Gender 0.446 0.865 0.0202 0.291 0.289 -0.0426 
 (0.467) (1.263) (0.258) (0.572) (0.263) (0.299) 
Age -0.0368* 0.0715 -0.00232 0.0185 -0.00957 0.00654 
 (0.0195) (0.0523) (0.00952) (0.0209) (0.00878) (0.0101) 
Years of education 0.563 -0.158 0.763* 0.204 0.0907 -0.175 
 (0.679) (1.678) (0.398) (0.810) (0.329) (0.320) 
Household composition  -0.0290 -0.188 0.0416 0.336** 0.0885 0.0692 
adults (0.133) (0.426) (0.0772) (0.147) (0.103) (0.128) 
Household composition  0.313*** 0.252 0.0944* 0.00145 0.0605 -0.0747 
children (0.0922) (0.287) (0.0511) (0.119) (0.0835) (0.0478) 
Asset: number of houses -34.84** -78.44 4.857 -33.34 -16.53 17.77 
 (17.24) (62.56) (8.853) (21.59) (10.24) (13.49) 
Asset: number of poultry 1.355 3.654 1.163* -1.061 1.119 -0.242 
 (1.073) (2.357) (0.679) (2.037) (0.847) (0.726) 
Asset: number of goats  0.298 34.93 0.108 -3.494 1.723 -1.677 
and sheep (3.083) (21.36) (1.960) (9.632) (1.903) (1.256) 
Asset: number of bicycles -74.79** -4.416 -58.22*** 61.10 -21.57 5.964 
 (31.65) (94.06) (16.37) (39.92) (13.96) (7.773) 
       
Observations 426 170 417 330 751 1,053 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
Table A3: Robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
FEAR LRA oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit 
        
Boma radio reception 3.632*** 1.859* 2.076* 2.606** 2.573** 5.160** 4.730*** 
 (0.982) (1.028) (1.182) (1.242) (1.196) (2.630) (1.428) 
Distance to DRC -5.640***       
 (2.139)       
Distance to CAR  -6.012      
  (4.238)      
Boma phone ownership   -0.0487**     
   (0.0198)     
Resident indicator    -0.297    
    (0.184)    
Movee indicator     0.555**   
     (0.262)   
        
Date of interview fixed 
effects 
NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
        
Observations 423 423 423 423 423 396 422 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
*** 𝑝<0.01, ** 𝑝<0.05, * 𝑝<0.1 
  
Table A4: Controlling for presence of other armed forces 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FEAR LRA oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit oprobit 
      
Boma radio reception 2.421* 2.612** 2.686** 2.569** 2.652** 
 (1.260) (1.267) (1.219) (1.201) (1.227) 
Seen US Army last year 0.414     
 (0.378)     
Seen UN last year  -0.0877    
  (0.238)    
Seen AU last year   0.0571   
   (0.164)   
Seen SPLA last year    -0.197  
    (0.219)  
Seen UPDF last year     -0.159 
     (0.172) 
      
Observations 414 421 418 421 421 
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses 
*** 𝑝<0.01, ** 𝑝<0.05, * 𝑝<0.1
 
